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The story of equal protection under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion is not a story of a steady movement to a particular position.
Rather, it is the story of an often confused Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, first not finding an equal protection provision under the
Pennsylvania Constitution at all, and then finding an equal pro-
tection provision in one article only to decide later that it is really
in another article. It is the story of the ebb and flow of equal pro-
tection analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds independent state constitu-
tional grounds for equal protection beyond that offered by the fed-
eral constitution only to hold later that there is no distinction be-
tween the equal protection clause of the federal constitution and
the equal protection provision of the state constitution. Finally, it
is a story of both heritage and promise: the heritage of a tradition
of independent judicial thinking making use of the unique proper-
ties of the Pennsylvania Constitution; the promise that such
thinking can again bear the fruits of liberty promised by the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
To understand the story, it is important to understand the
sources of equal protection law in Pennsylvania. It is important to
examine, in a chronological fashion, how those sources were used
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to shape equal protection
law in Pennsylvania and how equal protection analysis changed
over periods of time. This article will begin by examining the
sources of equal protection law in both the federal and the state
constitutions cited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over the
years, followed by a decade by decade examination of leading cases
in the area of equal protection under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. Finally, there will be a consideration of the current state of
* Russell Gerney, J.D., graduated from the Duquesne University School of Law in
2003. He has been an associate at Stephen J. O'Brien & Associates since October of 2003.
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equal protection analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution
and the directions it might go.
II. SOURCES OF EQUAL PROTECTION LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has identified two primary
sources of Equal Protection law available for the citizens of Penn-
sylvania. The first is the Constitution of the United States of
America, and the second is the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States1
is intended as a restraint upon intrusion by the federal govern-
ment against personal liberties. The Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States2 protects those same liberties from intrusion by state gov-
ernments.3
The Pennsylvania Constitution, on the other hand, has no spe-
cific Equal Protection Clause. As such, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has identified sections of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution which provide equal protection under the law. The sec-
tions that have been identified by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania are: Article I, Section 1; Article I, Section 17; Article I, Sec-
tion 26; Article I, Section 28; and Article III, Section 32.
Article I, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution originated
in the Constitution of 1776 in Chapter I, Section I. That section
1. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or na-
val forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service, in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy or life
or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for the public uses without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Gondleman v. Commonwealth, 554 A.2d. 896, 899 n.5 (Pa. 1989).
4. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Pennsylvania Constitution refer to
the current constitution signed on February 29, 1968.
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provides "t]hat all men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights,
amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety."5 The constitution of 1790 moved
this provision to Article IX, Section I, and provided a title, "Of the
equality and rights of men."6 The wording of the provision was
also slightly changed. The 1790 version provides "[t]hat all men
are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."'
The constitution of 1838 left the provision in Article IX, Section I,
but it changed the title to "Rights of life liberty property &c."' The
wording of the provision was again slightly changed. The 1838
version provides that "[a]ll men are born equally free and inde-
pendent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness.9 The 1874 constitution restored
the provision to Article I, Section 1, and provided a new title,
"Equality and rights of men." ° The current constitution, ratified
in 1968, retained the language and the placement of the provision
but added a new title, "Inherent Rights of Mankind.""
Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution first appeared, for equal
protection purposes, in the constitution of 1874. The clause was
entitled, "Laws ex post facto or implied contracts, irrevocable
grants, &c., forbidden." It provides that "[n]o ex post facto law, nor
any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevoca-
ble any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be
passed."" While it is true that the previous two constitutions had
both prohibited ex post facto laws and laws impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts, it is the final clause of this provision, making
unlawful the irrevocable grant of any special privileges or immu-
5. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, ch. I.
6. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. X, § I.
7. Id.
8. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § I.
9. Id.
10. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I, § 1.
11. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
12. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I, § 17.
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nities, which is new. This provision was retained in the current
constitution, at the same place and with no change in language,
except for the title which was changed to "Ex Post Facto Laws;
Impairment of Contracts." 3
Article I, Section 26, of the Pennsylvania Constitution first ap-
peared on May 16, 1967, as an amendment to the constitution of
1874 bearing the title "No Discrimination by Commonwealth and
Its Political Subdivisions."1 The provision provides that "[n]either
the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall
deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discrimi-
nate against any person in the exercise of any civil right."1" This
provision was retained at Article I, Section 26 with no change in
either its language or title.
Article I, Section 28, of the Pennsylvania Constitution was
added by amendment to the current constitution on May 18,
1971.16 Entitled "Prohibition Against Denial or Abridgment of
Equality of Right Because of Sex," this provision provides that
"[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual."7
The final section providing equal protection is Article III, Sec-
tion 32. This provision was originally in Article III, Section 7, of
the 1874 constitution. Entitled "Limitations of special legislation,
&c." it provides:
The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law
Authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens;
Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards,
boroughs, or school districts; Changing the names of persons
or places; Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; Au-
thorizing the laying out, opening altering or maintaining
roads, highways, streets, or alleys; Relating to ferries or
bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for
the erection of bridges crossing streams which form bounda-
ries between this and any other State; Vacating roads, town-
plats, streets or alleys; Relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or
13. PA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
14. PA. CONST. of 1874, Amendments: art. I, § 26, available at
http://www.paconstitution.duq.edu/con74.html (last visited January 14, 2003).
15. Id.
16. PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 28, available at
http://www.paconstitution.duq.edu/con68.html (last visited January 14, 2003).
17. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
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public grounds not of the State; Authorizing the adoption of
legitimatization of children; Locating or changing county
seats, erecting new counties or changing county lines: Incor-
porating cities, towns, villages, or changing their charters;
For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or
changing the place of voting; Granting divorces; Erecting
new townships or boroughs, changing township limits or
school districts. Creating offices, or prescribing the powers
and duties of officers in counties, cities, boroughs, townships,
election or school districts; Changing the law of descent of
succession; Regulating the practice of jurisdiction of, or
changing the rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding or
inquiry before the courts, aldermen, justices of the peace,
sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, auditors, masters in
chancery or other tribunals, or providing or changing methods
for the collection of debts, or the enforcing of judgments, or
prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate; Regulat-
ing the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen,
justices of the peace, magistrates or constables; Regulating
the management of public schools, the building or repairing of
school houses, and raising of money for such purposes; Fixing
the rate of interest; Affecting the estates of minors or persons
under disability, except after due notice to all parties in inter-
est, to be recited in the special enactment; Remitted fines,
penalties, and forfeitures, or refunding moneys legally paid
into the treasury; Exempting property from taxation; Regu-
lating labor, trade, mining, manufacturing; Creating corpora-
tions, or amending, renewing or extending the charters
thereof; Granting to any corporation, association, or individ-
ual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity, or to any
corporation, association or individual the right to lay down a
railroad track; Nor shall the General Assembly indirectly en-
act such special or local law by the partial repeal of a general
law; but laws repealing local or special acts may be passed:
Nor shall any law be passed granting powers or privileges in
any case where the granting of such powers and privileges
shall have been provided for by the general law, nor where
the courts have jurisdiction to grant the same or give the re-
lief asked for.18
18. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 7.
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This rather lengthy provision was revised and moved to Article
III, Section 32, in the 1968 constitution. Entitled "Certain Local
and Special Laws," it now provides:
The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in
any case which has been or can be provided for by general law
and specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local
or special law:
1. Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards
boroughs, or school districts:
2. Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys:
3. Locating or changing county seats, erecting new counties
or changing county lines:
4. Erecting new townships or boroughs, changing township
lines, borough limits or school districts:
5. Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, or refunding
moneys legally paid into the treasury:
6. Exempting property from taxation:
7. Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing:
8. Creating corporations, or amending, renewing or extending
the charters thereof:
Nor shall the General Assembly indirectly enact any special
or local law by the partial repeal of a general law; but laws
repealing local or special acts may be passed.'9
Each of the listed sections has been utilized in equal protection
analysis at one time or another since the ratification of the current
constitution in 1968. However, in order to get the best sense of
the history of equal protection analysis under the current consti-
tution, the best approach is a chronological examination of equal
protection cases.
19. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE 1970s-THE ROAD TO KROGER
During the 1970s, the majority of equal protection analyses in
Pennsylvania were conducted pursuant to Article III, Section 32,
of the constitution. Article I, Section 1, was used often in zoning
cases in substantive due process analyses. Other sections of the
Pennsylvania Constitution appear infrequently in equal protection
discussions.
The first cases to consider, however, pre-date the current consti-
tution. There was, of course, equal protection analysis in Penn-
sylvania prior to 1968. Two cases are worth noting. The first is
Seabolt v. Commissioners of Northumberland County." This case
was decided pursuant to, inter alia, Article III, Section 7, of 1874
constitution. The case concerned an act by the General Assembly
authorizing county commissioners to restore certain bridges which
had been destroyed by "ice, flood or otherwise (as e.g., by fire)."'
Seabolt is relevant because it is the genesis of the rational basis
test in Pennsylvania. The court held that:
Legislation for a class distinguished from a general subject is
not special but general, and classification is a legislative ques-
tion, subject to judicial revision only so far as to see that it is
founded on real distinctions in the subjects classified, and not
on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of evading
the constitutional prohibition. If the distinctions are genuine,
the courts cannot declare the classification void, though they
may not consider it to be on a sound basis. The test is not
wisdom, but good faith in the classification.22
This language was cited in the case of Dufour v. Maize. 3 In Du-
four, a strip mining company challenged an act by the General
Assembly requiring it to reclaim land upon which strip mining
had taken place. The strip mining company argued that the act
created an unconstitutional classification subjecting strip mining
companies to regulations not applied to drift or deep mining op-
erations.25 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the classifi-
20. 41 A. 22, 23 (Pa. 1898).
21. Seabolt, 41 A. at 23.
22. Id.
23. 56 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1948).
24. Dufour, 56 A.2d at 676.
25. Id. at 677-78.
Spring 2004
Duquesne Law Review
cation to be constitutional." Although the term "rational basis"
was not specifically used in either the Seabolt or the Dufour opin-
ions, both were cited in Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork
Company7 in the context of rational basis analysis under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.8
Meanwhile, Appeal of Girsh29 was the first in a line of cases in
the 1970's wherein the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania used Arti-
cle I, Section 1, for purposes of making a substantive due process
analysis. This was specifically stated in Surrick v. Zoning Board
of the Township of Upper Providence,"° where the court stated that
"this Court has employed a substantive due process analysis in
reviewing zoning schemes .. .3 This line of cases is significant
insomuch as it was part of the development of the rational basis
review in Pennsylvania.
However, before looking at the line of cases decided pursuant to
Article III, Section 32, it is appropriate to consider McIlvaine v.
Pennsylvania State Police.3 2 This was an age discrimination case
in which the plaintiff argued that the Pennsylvania State Police's
mandatory retirement age violated Article I, Section 26, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.3' The majority, in a rather unremark-
able opinion, noted some procedural irregularities and then af-
firmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court without address-
ing the issue of equal protection.' In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Roberts opined that "the right to employment free from age dis-
crimination is a civil right protected by both the Human Relations
Act and the 1968 Constitution."' Furthermore, according to Jus-
tice Roberts, mandatory retirement based solely on age was dis-
criminatory and therefore violated Article I Section 26 of the Con-
stitution.36 Justice Roberts also argued that the mandatory re-
tirement age also violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.7
However, he distinguished his equal protection argument from his
26. Id.
27. 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978).
28. Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 718.
29. 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970).
30. 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
31. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 108.
32. 309 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1973).
33. McIlvaine, 309 A.2d at 802.
34. Id. at 803.
35. Id. at 805 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 807.
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argument pursuant to Article I, Section 26, by writing that there
were two separate and distinct grounds for his dissent.38
Justice Roberts did not openly argue that Article I, Section 26,
of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided equal protection under
the law and thus was the equal protection clause of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. In fact, it could be argued that because he
distinguished Article I, Section 26, from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, he actually argued that Article I, Section 26, did not serve
as Pennsylvania's equal protection clause. However, his analysis
under Article I, Section 26, did have some of the hallmarks of an
equal protection analysis. He wrote about civil rights, discrimina-
tory denial of civil rights, classifications and placing the burden of
justifying the classification on the Commonwealth.3 9 All of these
are terms, phrases and ideas often found in federal equal protec-
tion analyses.40
Justice Roberts' dissent, however, does not appear to have had a
significant impact on equal protection analysis in Pennsylvania.
Article I, Section 26, did not become important in equal protection
analysis until over a decade later.
True equal protection analysis under the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution seems to have its genesis in a 1974 case-Estate of Cavill.41
Although Article III, Section 32, was mentioned only in a footnote,
it was mentioned in the same context as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42  Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania engaged in a discussion of the tests
to be used in an equal protection analysis. While it is true that
these discussions were in the context of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the tests discussed later will be used by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Roberts, provided that
the appropriate test in an equal protection case is whether or not a
classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation-
ship to the object of the legislation."4 3 Here, the majority quoted
language from a 1920 case decided by the Supreme Court of the
38. Id. at 807 n.12.
39. McIlvaine, 309 A.2d at 805-06 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. 329 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1974).
42. Cavill, 329 A.2d at 505 n.7.
43. Id. at 505.
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United States-Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia." In his dissent,
Justice Pomeroy argued that the proper test is the rational basis
test, as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in a
line of cases from the late 1960's and early 1970's.45 The dissent
also acknowledged a second test (although it did not use the term
"strict scrutiny") that must be used when a suspect classification
or a fundamental right is implicated.46
While this case did almost nothing to further equal protection
analyses under the Pennsylvania Constitution itself, it did present
the relevant tests and the dichotomy between the "fair and sub-
stantial relationship" test of Royster Guano and the "rational ba-
sis" test later articulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States. This dichotomy would continue for some years in the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania despite the fact that the Supreme
Court of the United States had essentially disavowed the "fair and
substantial relationship" test of Royster Guano in favor of the "ra-
tional basis" test.
47
The next significant case was Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing
Home Loan Agency. 5 In this case the plaintiff argued that a law
passed by the Legislature which provided money in the form of
loans to nursing homes that met all the Federal and state regula-
tions for acceptance of Medicaid patients, while denying those
moneys to nursing homes which did not meet those regulations,
was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution.49
Here, the majority held that the Legislature was not forbidden
from creating special laws provided that the law has "some ra-
tional relationship to a proper state purpose." ° Again, we see
terminology associated with equal protection analysis, even
though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still did not identify it as
such in this case. However, only a few months later, the court
found that it was doing equal protection analysis in Tosto when it
decided Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth.5
44. 253 U.S 412 (1920).
45. Cavill, 329 A.2d at 506-07 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (citing Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970)); McDonald v. Board of Education 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
46. Cavill, 329 A.2d at 507 n.3 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
47. GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 570 (3d ed. 1996).
48. 331 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1975).
49. Tosto, 331 A.2d at 204.
50. Id.
51. 334 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1975)
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In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., the railroad argued that a
law passed by the Legislature, directing it to adopt weekly pay
periods for certain employees,52 violated, inter alia, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article III, Section 32, of
the Pennsylvania Constitution because the law discriminated
against the railroad without any rational basis for the distinc-
tion.53 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the law to be
constitutional.'
There were several important holdings in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. The first was that content of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution were not
significantly different.55 The second was a reiteration of the "ra-
tional relationship to a proper state purpose" standard." Again,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to openly state that it
was doing an equal protection analysis pursuant to the state con-
stitution while it used equal protection terminology.
Finally, in July, 1975, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ex-
plicitly announced the existence of an equal protection provision in
the Pennsylvania Constitution in Moyer v. Phillips.57 Moyer in-
volved a challenge to a state survival statute, which provided that
all causes of action survived the death of the defendant except ac-
tions in slander or libel.5 8 The plaintiff brought an action for libel
against the defendant, but the defendant died before the matter
went to trial. 9 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs case on the
basis that the cause of action died with the defendant." The
plaintiff argued that the exception of libel from the survival stat-
ute was an arbitrary denial of equal protection.6' The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania agreed.62
Specifically, the court held that reputation was a fundamental
right.63 It also held that both the United States and Pennsylvania
52. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 334 A.2d at 638.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 639.
55. Id. at 643.
56. Id.
57. 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975).
58. Moyer, 341 A.2d at 442.
59. Id. at 441.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 442.
62. Id.
63. Moyer, 341 A.2d at 443.
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constitutions contain an equal protection provision.64 The majority
opinion, however, did not identify where the equal protection pro-
vision of the Pennsylvania Constitution was located. 5 Further-
more, despite the fact that the majority held that reputation is a
fundamental right,66 the test used to find the statute unconstitu-
tional was the "fair and substantial relationship" test of Royster
Guano, rather than a strict scrutiny testy.
Nevertheless, despite its faults, Moyer was a highly significant
opinion. For the first time, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
openly held that the Pennsylvania Constitution had an equal pro-
tection provision, and that this provision was within Article III,
Section 32.
The next important decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, Adoption of Walker,66 involved Article I, Section 28. While
Article I, Section 28, was specifically written to prohibit discrimi-
nation based on sex, rather than on a broader equal protection
basis, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursu-
ant to this section are part of, and add to, the general corpus of
equal protection case law in this Commonwealth.
Walker dealt with the Adoption Act passed by the Legislature,
which provided that in the case of an illegitimate child, the con-
sent of the natural father was not necessary should another per-
son wish to adopt that child. 9 In Walker, the parental rights of
the natural father were terminated despite the fact that he re-
ceived no notice of proceedings to terminate those rights, and
thus, his child was adopted without his consent. 7' The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the Adoption Act violated Article I,
Section 28, of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the Act
made an impermissible distinction between unwed mothers and
unwed fathers based solely on sex.7' The court also noted that the
Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the Act denied
equal protection of the laws to unwed fathers as opposed to all
other types of parents.72
64. Id.
65. That piece of information comes from the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts who
locates it in Article III, Section 32. Id. at 447 n.5.
66. Id. at 443.
67. Id.
68. 360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976).
69. Walker, 360 A.2d at 605.
70. Id. at 605.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 606 n.l1.
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Again, we see the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania making an
equal protection type analysis without specifically holding that it
was in fact doing so. Thus, Walker suggests that Article I, Section
28, implicated equal protection without making a specific holding
that it does so. The result was a lack of clarity regarding the
analysis to be used where Article I, Section 28, was implicated. It
would be some time later before the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania would clarify how Article I, Section 28, should be analyzed.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania continued its
general equal protection analysis pursuant to Article III, Section
32. In Freezer Storage, the court considered the constitutionality
of a statute of repose, which afforded protection to builders (i.e.,
engineers, architects, contractors and the various tradesmen in-
volved in constructing a building), while not affording the same
protection to others involved in the improvement of real estate,
such as landowners and suppliers of building materials.73 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute did not offend
the Pennsylvania Constitution.74 The problem with Freezer Stor-
age is that it is very difficult to ascertain whether the Court was
doing an equal protection analysis, or if it decided the case on the
more narrow "special law" ground also found in Article III, Section
32. On the one hand, the Freezer Storage court focused closely on
the term "special law," which was found in Article III, Section 32."
However, on the other hand, it used an equal protection test in
finding the statute constitutional."
The opinion was authored by Justice Roberts, who also authored
the majority opinion in both Estate of Cavill and Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad. Justice Roberts did not find an equal protection
provision within the Pennsylvania Constitution in those earlier
opinions, and he failed to do so here. The irony is that even
though he carefully avoided using the term "equal protection" and
he avoided any mention of the Fourteenth Amendment, he did use
an equal protection test in doing his analysis, thus setting the
stage for an equal protection decision based solely upon the Penn-
sylvania Constitution and independent of any analysis promul-
gated by the Supreme Court of the United States.






The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did just that in Kroger Co. v.
O'Hara Township." In Kroger, the court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Sunday Trading Laws, com-
monly called Blue Laws, which criminalized many commercial and
business activities if they were performed on Sundays."8 The court
held that the Blue Laws denied Kroger (and the other appellants
in the case) "the equal protection guaranteed by our Pennsylvania
Constitution.. . ."" Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, fi-
nally and explicitly, held that the equal protection provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution was in Article III, Section 32.80 Fur-
thermore, the Kroger court reiterated that the test to be used in
examining a statute, when challenged on an equal protection
ground, was the "fair and substantial relationship" test.81 Finally,
in yet another show of judicial independence, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court acknowledged the federal test for examining state
statutes that touch upon explicit or implicit constitutional rights,
but then proceeded to use the "fair and substantial relationship"
test it had articulated in Estate of Cavill and Moyer.8 2 The end
result was a decision solely based upon the state constitution us-
ing an equal protection test adopted by the Commonwealth's high-
est court. This was truly equal protection analysis under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
The next significant case was In re "B,"83 decided about a year
after Kroger. The issue in In re "B" was whether a psychiatrist
could be compelled by a court to release psychiatric records with-
out the consent of the patient.' The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held that a patient's right to prevent the disclosure of such
records was constitutionally based as part of an individual's right
of privacy.85 Furthermore, the court held that, in certain respects,
the Pennsylvania Constitution provided "more rigorous and ex-
plicit protection for a person's right of privacy" than the U.S. Con-
stitution.86
77. 392 A-2d 266 (Pa. 1978).
78. Kroger, 392 A.2d at 267.
79. Id. at 273.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 275.
82. Id at 274-75
83. 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978).
84. In re "B," 394 A.2d at 420-21.




While finding a right of privacy was not itself groundbreaking,
the important aspect of In re "B" was the fact that the Court indi-
cated that the Pennsylvania Constitution provided more protec-
tion for the right than the U.S. Constitution. Thus, by way of logi-
cal extension, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding provided
that the courts of this Commonwealth need not be bound by the
rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States in the area of
right of privacy, provided that the grounds for their rulings were
based on the state constitution and that such rulings did not pro-
vide less protection than that afforded by the federal constitution.
The final significant case of the 1970's was Danson v. Casey.7
The dissent was another step forward for independent equal pro-
tection analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The major-
ity opinion, however, was a foreshadowing of the coming retreat
from the boldness of Kroger.
In Danson, the appellants argued that because the Philadelphia
School District had and would continue to have inadequate reve-
nues, the pupils of the schools in that district were receiving a
truncated and limited program of educational services.8 The ap-
pellants' arguments focused on two sections of the Pennsylvania
Constitution-Article III, Section 32, and Article III, Section 14,
which provided that "[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of
public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth."89 The
majority opinion found no constitutional violation in the way the
Philadelphia School District was funded, and thus, it affirmed the
decision of the Commonwealth Court dismissing appellants' ac-
tion.9"
The majority's opinion was remarkable in what it did not say.
Despite the fact that Article III, Section 32, had been identified as
the equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
the majority quoted language from that section which prohibited
the General Assembly from regulating, inter alia, the affairs of
school districts.9" There was no equal protection analysis in the
majority opinion. Furthermore, aside from mentioning that appel-
lants' contended that Article III, Section 14, was also implicated,
the majority did not analyze that constitutional provision.
87. 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
88. Danson, 399 A.2d at 362.
89. Id. at 362.
90. Id. at 367.
91. Id. at 362 n.2.
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In his dissent, Justice Manderino, on the other hand, stated
that the appellants had in fact challenged the funding of the
Philadelphia School District on an equal protection ground.92 Fur-
thermore, Justice Manderino opined that pursuant to Article III,
Section 14, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, education was a
fundamental right, and thus, the funding of the school district
must be strictly scrutinized.93
The dichotomy of this opinion was representative of the forces
that shaped equal protection analysis in Pennsylvania during the
1970's. On the one hand, the majority opinion, authored by the
same Justice Roberts who authored the majority opinions in Es-
tate of Cavill, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and Freezer Storage,
sought to limit the scope of Article III, Section 32, and use it only
in its narrower, literal meaning. The dissent, authored by Justice
Manderino, who had also authored the majority opinions in Kroger
and In re "B," sought to read not just Article III, Section 32, but
the entire Pennsylvania Constitution in a broader, more expansive
manner.
In the long run, however, it seems that during the 1970's, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court more often read the Pennsylvania
Constitution in a more expansive manner in the area of equal pro-
tection. In the 1970's, the court declared that both reputation and
privacy were fundamental rights protected by the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and that the Pennsylvania Constitution afforded
greater protection of the right of privacy than the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, the court published a dissenting opinion stat-
ing that education was also a fundamental right. While that was
not binding precedent, it could be used as a persuasive opinion at
a later date.
The 1970's also produced significant decisions in terms of equal
protection. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also identified Arti-
cle III, Section 32, as the equal protection provision in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution and provided that the appropriate test un-
der that provision was the "fair and substantial relationship" test.
Finally, the 1970's also produced a significant decision in the
area of gender discrimination. In Walker, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that under Article I, Section 28, unwed fathers
must be afforded the same protection as unwed mothers under the
law.
92. Id. at 369 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
93. Danson, 399 A.2d at 371 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE 1980's-THE SWITCH IN PARKER
WHITE METAL
The 1980's can be divided into two parts: before Parker White
Metal and after Parker White Metal. In Parker White Metal,' the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the equal protection
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution was not in Article III,
Section 32, but in Article I, Section 26.
However, there were important cases in the 1980's which pre-
dated Parker White Metal. The first of these was Pittsburgh Corn-
ing Corporation v. Bradley.95 This case dealt with a challenge to
the constitutionality of Philadelphia County's Court of Common
Pleas decision to create a separate docket with special rules to
handle asbestos litigation.96 The Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas allowed the asbestos calendar judge on the asbestos docket
to assign any asbestos case to a judge for a bench trial, after which
either party could demand a de novo jury trial.97 The petitioner's
contention was that because these special rules only applied to
asbestos litigation, they were "violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution and Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion."98 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found no violation of
either section.99
The interesting part of this decision is the way in which the
equal protection issue was couched. Looking at the language
quoted above, it seems that Justice Roberts found that equal pro-
tection was only in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than in
both the Fourteenth Amendment and Article III, Section 32. It is
also worthy to note that Justice Manderino had died, and thus, he
was no longer serving on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
when this decision was handed down.
While it may seem to be an exercise in minutiae to examine one
phrase in a decision, that phrase is important because it was in-
dicative of the way Article III, Section 32, would become mini-
mized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court during the 1980's.
This minimization continued in Commonwealth v. Hicks,100 where
94. 515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986).
95. 453 A.2d 314 (Pa. 1982).
96. Pittsburgh Corning, 453 A.2d at 315.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 317.
99. Id.
100. 466 A.2d 613 (Pa. 1983).
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Chief Justice Roberts noted the tests used by the United States
Supreme Court in making an equal protection analysis.' ° He then
referred to the "prohibition against special legislation contained in
Article III, Section 32," and cited Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.
1 2
His cite, however, was not to the part of that decision which held
that the content of the Equal Protection Clause and Article III,
Section 32, were not significantly different, °3 but rather, he cited
to the part of that decision where the court discussed the appro-
priate test to use."0 In so doing, Chief Justice Roberts attempted
to separate Article III, Section 32, from equal protection analysis.
This separation, however, does not appear to be an attempt to es-
tablish an independent state constitutional ground for equal pro-
tection claims; rather, it seems an attempt to limit equal protec-
tion claims in Pennsylvania to federal law grounds and the deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court.
This separation continued in a case decided only two days after
Hicks: Astemborski v. Susmarski.°5 Ironically, this case also sig-
naled a return to independent equal protection analysis. Astem-
borski involved a constitutional challenge to a statute of limita-
tions which provided that all actions to establish the paternity of a
child born out of wedlock must be commenced within six years of
the child's birth.0 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified
the primary issue as "whether the six year statute of limitations
violate[d] equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and of Article I, [Section]
26, of the Pennsylvania Constitution."1' Furthermore, this case
reinstated a judgment that had been vacated by the United States
Supreme Court, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that their original holding had been correct under federal law.'
This case was significant for several reasons. First, and most
obviously, there was an explicit declaration by Pennsylvania's
highest court that Article I, Section 26, of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution was the equal protection provision. Second, this case was
important due to the fact that a vacated judgment was reinstated.
101. Hicks, 466 A.2d at 615.
102. Id. (citing B&O Railroad, 334 A.2d at 636, 643).
103. B&O Railroad, 334 A.2d at 643.
104. Hicks, 466 A.2d at 615.
105. 466 A.2d 1018 (Pa. 1983).
106. Astemborski, 466 A.2d at 1019.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1018-19.
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At first glance, the reinstatement of a vacated judgment would
seem to indicate an independence from federal equal protection
analysis; however, a close reading of the case clearly shows that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to rely on federal case
law in making its decision. Nevertheless, while this does not have
the significance of a reinstatement based upon equal protection
under the Pennsylvania Constitution, it does indicate a small level
of independence from federal equal protection analysis.
The spirit of independent analysis in Astemborski was also seen
in Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Insurance Com-
missioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.19 In Hartford, a
complaint was lodged with the Insurance Commissioner by a male
driver who contended that Hartford's policy of charging unmarried
men higher premiums than those charged to unmarried women
was in violation of the Rate Act's prohibition of "unfairly discrimi-
natory" rates."0  The Insurance Commissioner, interpreting the
Rate Act's prohibition in light of Article I, Section 28, of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution agreed."' Hartford filed a petition for re-
view with the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Insur-
ance Commissioner's decision."2 The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court."3
The most important part of the decision involved a discussion of
the "state action" doctrine, where Chief Justice Nix wrote the fol-
lowing:
Further, the notion that the interpretation of this insurance
statute involves the concept of "state action" is incorrect in
this context. The "state action" test is applied by the courts in
determining whether, in a given case, a state's involvement in
private activity is sufficient to justify the application of a fed-
eral constitutional prohibition of state action to that conduct.
The rationale underlying the "state action" doctrine is irrele-
vant to the interpretation of the scope of the Pennsylvania
Equal Rights Amendment, a state constitutional amendment
adopted by the Commonwealth as part of its own organic law.
109. 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
110. Hartford, 482 A.2d at 543-44.
111. Id. at 544.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 549.
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The language of that enactment, not a test used to measure the
extent of federal constitutional protections is controlling."'
Clearly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was making this deci-
sion based upon independent state constitution grounds. Thus, in
the narrower area of equal protection in terms of gender, the
Court showed a willingness to eschew federal case law and looked
to the constitution and case law of Pennsylvania.
Meanwhile, as applied to the other areas of equal protection, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems not to have known which sec-
tion of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided equal protection.
This confusion is amply demonstrated when Astemborski is com-
pared to Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Spa Athletic
Club.'15
The issue in Spa Athletic Club concerned the revocation of the
club's liquor license pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute, which
provides that an establishment's liquor license must be returned
to the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) for safekeeping
if, for some reason beyond the licensee's control, the establishment
is not in operation for fifteen consecutive days."6 If the establish-
ment was a private club the licensee had two years to resume op-
erations, but a non-club establishment had an indefinite period of
time provided that the resumption of operation remained beyond
the licensee's control."' The Spa Athletic Club had had its license
revoked by the PLCB after the club remained inoperative for two
consecutive years."' The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
found the statute to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protec-
tion.19 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision
of the Erie court and reinstated the decision of the PLCB.1
2
0
There were two significant holdings in this decision. The first
was that "the equal protection clause and the prohibition of special
legislation [were] substantially similar." 2' This first holding,
made approximately a year after the Astemborski Court found the
equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be
in Article I, Section 26, unfortunately only added confusion to
114. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
115. 485 A.2d 732 (Pa. 1984).
116. Spa Athletic Club, 485 A.2d at 733-34.
117. Id. at 734.
118. Id. at 733-34.
119. Id. at 734.
120. Id. at 736.
121. Spa Athletic Club, 485 A.2d at 734.
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equal protection analysis. The second significant holding, how-
ever, provided greater clarity in the area of equal protection under
the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In its second holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted
James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,22
and reiterated the standards of judicial review to be used in an
equal protection analysis:
The first type-classifications implicating neither suspect
classes nor fundamental rights-will be sustained if it meets
a "rational basis" test. In the second type of cases, where a
suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right
has been burdened, another standard of review is applied:
that of strict scrutiny. Finally, in the third type of cases, if
"important" though not fundamental rights are affected by
the classification, or if "sensitive" classifications have been
made, the United States Supreme Court has employed what
may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a
heightened standard of review.
Furthermore, the court spoke to allocation of burden by holding
that "[t]he burden must remain upon the person challenging the
constitutionality of the legislation to demonstrate that it does not
have a rational basis. Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law was accurate is irrelevant to this dis-
cussion because the court used these three standards to interpret
not just the federal constitution, but also the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, as evidenced by its holding that because the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article II, Section 32, are substantially similar,
they are to be treated "together in our discussion of the constitu-
tional issue."'24
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified the dichotomy, cre-
ated by Astemborski and Spa Athletic Club in equal protection law
a year later in Fisher v. Department of Public Welfare,'25 and in so
doing, the court provided a clear and concise opinion of equal pro-
tection law in Pennsylvania.
122. 477 A.2d 1302 (Pa. 1984).
123. Spa Athletic Club, 485 A.2d at 734 (quoting James, 477 A.2d at 1302 (citations
omitted)).
124. Id. at 734.
125. 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985).
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The case had its genesis in a provision of the Public Welfare
Code, which provided that no public funds would be expended to
provide abortions, except where a physician certified in writing
that the procedure was necessary to protect the life of the mother
or in cases where the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest,
provided that the rape was reported to the police within 72 hours,
or the incest was reported to the police within 72 hours from when
the woman first learned she was pregnant."' Trial was held be-
fore the Commonwealth Court. The presiding judge held that the
statute violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and that portions
of it also violated both federal and state rights to privacy.'2 7 The
Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial judge's
decision regarding the rape and incest provisions of the statute,
but it overturned the judge's decision regarding the restricting of
funding for abortions only to life threatening situations.12' The
plaintiffs appealed from the en banc panel's holding regarding the
restriction on abortion funding on equal protection grounds based
on Article I, Section 1, and Article III, Section 32, non-
discriminatory grounds as provided by Article I, Section 26, and
on gender equality grounds based on Article I, Section 28.129
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis pursuant
to the state constitution by holding that Article III, Section 32,
when combined with Article I, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, provided equal protection under the law for citizens of
Pennsylvania.3 ' The court then reaffirmed its earlier holding in
PLCB v. Spa Athletic Club by again stating that there were three
standards of review applicable in an equal protection case: strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis.'3' The court
then held that strict scrutiny applies when a right is fundamental,
that is, a right found in the Pennsylvania Constitution, or when
the statute affects a suspect class, and that in order to survive
strict scrutiny, the state must be able to show a compelling inter-
est.132 Intermediate scrutiny applies when either an important
interest, generally described as a liberty interest or a benefit vital
to the individual, has been affected or when a sensitive, though
126. Fisher, 502 A.2d at 117.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 117-18.
130. Id. at 120.
131. Fisher, 502 A.2d at 121.
132. Id. at 121-22.
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not suspect, classification has been made. 3' To survive intermedi-
ate scrutiny, the governmental interest must be important, the
classifications must be drawn so as to be closely related to the ob-
jectives of the legislation and a person denied a benefit must be
permitted to challenge that denial "on the grounds that his par-
ticular denial would not further the governmental purpose of the
legislation."'m Lastly, the court held that in order for a classifica-
tion within a piece of legislation to survive a constitutional attack
under the rational basis test, the classification "need only be di-
rected at the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental inter-
est, and to do so in a manner which is not arbitrary or unreason-
able.-' 35
While it is true that none of these holdings are ground-breaking,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not previously provided
such clear direction in the field of equal protection analysis. In
that regard, this decision is significant.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then moved on to interpret
Article I, Section 26. Here, the court held that Article I, Section
26, made "more explicit the citizenry's constitutional safeguards
not to be harassed or punished for the exercise of their constitu-
tional rights. It can not however be construed as an entitlement
provision .... ,,13' Thus, "Article I, [Section] 26, does not in itself
define a new substantive civil right."137 The proper standard of
review when analyzing this section is what "has sometimes been
referred to as the 'penalty' analysis, whereby the focus is whether
a person has been somehow penalized for the exercise of a consti-
tutional freedom."38
Lastly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked to Article I,
Section 28, commonly known as the Equal Rights Amendment.
First, the court cited and reaffirmed an earlier decision which held
the following:
The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure equal-
ity of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for
distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no
longer a permissible factor in the determination of their legal
133. Id. at 122.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Fisher, 502 A.2d at 123.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 124.
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rights and legal responsibilities. The law will not impose dif-
ferent burdens upon the members of a society based on the
fact that they may be man or woman.1 3 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then noted that distinctions
which "rely on and perpetuate stereotypes as to the responsibili-
ties and capabilities of men and women are an anathema to the
principles of the [Equal Rights Amendment]." 14' That is tempered,
however, with the holding that "the [Equal Rights Amendment]
'does not prohibit differential treatment among the sexes when, as
here that treatment is reasonable and genuinely based on physical
characteristics unique to one sex." 141 To illustrate the difference,
the court noted that it struck down a school district regulation
which required women who were more than five months pregnant
to resign on the presumption that such women were disabled as a
result of their pregnancy while not requiring men, who might be
temporarily disabled from a variety of illnesses, to resign from
their employment.1 2 Whereas, in the instant matter, "the decision
whether or not to carry a fetus to term is so unique as to have no
concomitance in the male of the species. " 43
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to be saying that the
key aspects of an analysis under Article I, Section 28, are whether
the distinctions merely perpetuate old stereotypes or whether they
are based on genuine physiological differences between men and
women.
It is also significant to note that this was a unanimous decision
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-there were neither dissent-
ing nor concurring opinions. While it is true that a holding does
not carry greater precedential weight or value because of a
unanimous court, it is also true that such holdings carry a certain
moral force. On a practical level, a unanimous decision precludes
a later party from taking up a dissenting or concurring opinion
and asking a court to change the law based upon that dissent or
concurrence. The Fisher court, because it was a unanimous court
and because it fully analyzed the relevant parts of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution and provided the standards of review to be
used, provided a level of clarity to equal protection analysis here-
139. Id.
140. Id. at 125.
141. Fisher, 502 A.2d at 125 (quoting People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (Colo. 1976)).
142. Fisher, 502 A.2d at 125.
143. Id. at 126.
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tofore unseen in Pennsylvania. No matter what a person's posi-
tion on abortion, this decision added a great deal in clarifying and
regularizing equal protection analysis in Pennsylvania.
Finally, it should be noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found no violation of any provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and affirmed the holding of the Commonwealth
Court en banc.'"
The clarity provided by the Fisher Court in December of 1985,
however, was short-lived. In October, 1986, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court decided two cases which, while not explicitly overrul-
ing Fisher, completely changed equal protection analysis in Penn-
sylvania.
The first case, which will be touched upon only briefly, was
Smith v. City of Philadelphia.1' This case, decided on October 3,
1986, provided an important holding and an important point in
the dissent. In the majority opinion, Justice Flaherty reaffirmed
that Article III, Section 32, was the equal protection provision of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.'46 However, Justice Larsen, in his
dissent, wrote that the equal protection provision in the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution is in Article I, Section 26.147 Six days later, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Parker
White Metal Co.
148
Parker White Metal sounds the death knell for equal protection
analysis under Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution. While the demise of equal protection analysis pursuant to
Article III, Section 32, would take almost a decade to complete,
and while those death throes wrought havoc on orderly equal pro-
tection analysis, the beginning of the end can be traced to the de-
cision in Parker White Metal.
Parker White Metal dealt with a statute which proscribed iden-
tical conduct, the dumping of solid waste or hazardous waste
without a permit, but which provided for two vastly different pen-
alties. 49 The Erie County Court of Common Pleas found that the
statute violated Article I, Section 26, of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution. 5' The Commonwealth appealed, and the matter was
144. Id.
145. 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986).
146. Smith, 516 A.2d at 310.
147. Id. at 313 (Larsen, J. dissenting).
148. 515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986).
149. Parker White Metal, 515 A.2d at 1360-61.
150. Id. at 1361.
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brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania because it has
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of courts of
common pleas where a statute has been held to be unconstitu-
tional.'5 '
The majority opinion, written by Justice Larsen, held that the
equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution is Ar-
ticle I, Section 26.152 Justice Larsen also wrote, in a footnote, that
Article III, Section 32, contains additional equal protection guar-
antees.' Nevertheless, despite this footnote, Justice Larsen
changed equal protection analysis in Pennsylvania.
The opinion reaffirmed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
still used the three classifications-strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny and rational basis-when doing an equal protection
analysis." The opinion also added one new item to equal protec-
tion analysis-specifically, the need to determine if a classification
has actually been created.'
Perhaps the most ironic part of this opinion is that Justice
Flaherty joined it even though, only less than a week earlier, he
had written the majority opinion in Smith, which held that the
equal protection provision was in Article III, Section 32. '56
A few weeks after the decision in Parker White Metal, on Octo-
ber 23, 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Lyles v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation,1 7 in which the court addressed the question of
whether the statutory limit on damages recoverable against the
Commonwealth was constitutional.5 8 In its discussion, the court
made a reference to the equal protection provision of the Federal
Constitution and Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. What is lacking in this opinion is a footnote or quota-
tion from an earlier case stating that Article III, Section 32, was
substantially similar to the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
151. Id. at 1362.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1363 n.8.
154. Parker White Metal, 515 A.2d at 1363.
155. Id.
156. Smith, 516 A.2d at 310.
157. 516 A.2d 701 (Pa. 1986).




teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the pre-
Parker White Metal cases, such a reference was commonplace. 6 '
About a year later, in Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again held that
Article III, Section 32, was "sufficiently similar to the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution as to warrant like
application.""' However, there was no separate analysis of the
state constitutional provision. The Barasch Court merely held
that the state constitutional argument failed for the exact same
reasons as the federal equal protection argument failed.'63 This
opinion, while invoking Article III, Section 32, only showed how
far in esteem that provision had fallen as demonstrated by the
Barasch Court's failure to do a separate equal protection analysis
under the state provision.
While Article III, Section 32, continued to fall into disuse, cer-
tain previous holdings were being affirmed and revitalized. In a
case involving alleged defamation, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had to balance the fundamental right of reputation against
Pennsylvania's Shield Law protecting the confidential sources of
newspersons.' 4 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed
that reputation is a fundamental right, and held that in a defama-
tion of a public official case, the plaintiff could discover unpub-
lished information provided that information which would lead to
the discovery of the names of confidential sources could be re-
moved.' 5 The court determined that such a holding would permit
the plaintiff to make a more meaningful inquiry into whether or
not "actual malice" (i.e., that it was made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not)
existed.'66 Here, the court maintained the integrity of the right of
reputation while still protecting both confidential media sources
and freedom of the press.
The next important equal protection case was Commonwealth v.
Hardcastle."' In this case, the appellant was convicted of two
160. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 334 A.2d 636 (Pa.
1975); Kroger v. O'Hara Township, 392 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1978); Fisher v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985); and Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986).
161. 532 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1987).
162. Barasch, 532 A.2d at 339.
163. Id.
164. Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 532 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1987).
165. Hatchard, 532 A.2d at 351.
166. Id. at 349.
167. 546 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1988).
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counts of murder and sentenced to death.' Appellant challenged
his conviction on equal protection grounds, claiming that the
prosecuting attorney had improperly exercised the government's
peremptory challenges against twelve of the fourteen black jurors
interviewed.'69 Using federal case law, the majority upheld both
the conviction and the sentence. "
It is the dissent of Chief Justice Nix which is of greater interest
in this case. Chief Justice Nix found the use of peremptory chal-
lenges unconstitutional under Article I, Section 26, because of the
arbitrary nature of peremptory challenges.'71
Chief Justice Nix's dissent is one of the very few places where
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the state constitution to
analyze a race-based equal protection challenge. While this dis-
sent obviously did not become precedent, it allowed future appel-
lants to make a colorable state constitution claim. In that regard,
Chief Justice Nix's dissent was groundbreaking.
The next case, Gondleman v. Commonwealth,"v2 is interesting
only insomuch as it added yet more confusion to the already
murky area of equal protection under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution is in
Article I, Section 1, and that Article I, Section 26, merely rein-
forces Article I, Section 1.17
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to muddy equal
protection analysis in Klein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
State Employees' Retirement Board,"74 in which it addressed the
issue of whether the Commonwealth could pay judges who per-
formed the same functions and duties different rates of compensa-
tion based solely upon the date the judge entered office.'75 The
majority held that the payment scheme violated the equal protec-
tion provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
17 6
In its discussion of equal protection, the majority opinion (writ-
ten by Justice Larsen) held that the equal protection provisions of
the Pennsylvania Constitution were in Article III, Section 32; Ar-
168. Hardcastle, 546 A-2d at 1103.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1112.
171. Id. at 1114.
172. 554 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1989).
173. Gondleman, 554 A.2d at 903.
174. 555 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 1989).
175. Klein, 555 A.2d at 1217.
176. Id.
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ticle I, Section 1; and Article I, Section 26.177 Justice Larsen cited
all three sections which, at one time or another, were held to be
the equal protection provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Unfortunately, Justice Larsen's shotgun approach to finding the
equal protection provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution did
little to clarify equal protection analysis. To the majority's credit,
however, the opinion reaffirmed the three standards of review to
be used in equal protection analysis-strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny and rational basis.178
The 1980's were a time of both clarity and confusion in equal
protection analysis. On the one hand, there was the clarity of
Fisher. On the other hand, however, there was the confusion
brought about by Parker White Metal. Out of this mix came sev-
eral important holdings. The most important was the adoption of
the three standards of review. Almost as important was the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Hartford that it would
not be bound by federal case law in the area of gender discrimina-
tion. Next was the reaffirmation of reputation as a fundamental
right in Hatchard. Finally, there was Chief Justice Nix's dissent-
ing opinion in Hardcastle in which he contended that peremptory
challenges violate the equal protection provision of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE 1990'S-THE RETREAT FROM
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
The 1990's begin with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court charg-
ing not only itself, but the entire Pennsylvania judiciary and bar,
with the responsibility to analyze claims under the Pennsylvania
Constitution with vigor and independence. The 1990's ended with
the court retreating into the safety of taking federal case law and
applying it to a given case without seriously considering equal
protection under the state constitution.
The promise of the 1990's began with Commonwealth v. Ed-
munds.'79 Although not an equal protection case per se, it had
wide ranging implications that included equal protection analysis.
The Edmunds Court made a number of holdings intended to serve
as guideposts for those bringing state constitution claims. The
first was: "[W]e have stated with increasing frequency that it is
177. Id. at 1224.
178. Id.
179. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
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important and necessary that we undertake an independent
analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of
that fundamental document is implicated."' Furthermore, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that while it may accord weight
to federal decisions, "we are free to reject the conclusions of the
United States Supreme Court so long as we remain faithful to the
minimum guarantees established by the United States Constitu-
tion."'81 However, when doing so, the United States Supreme
Court, pursuant to Michigan v. Long,"' required the state su-
preme court to make "a 'plain statement' of the adequate and in-
dependent state grounds upon which we rely, in order to avoid any
doubt that we have rested our decision squarely upon Pennsyl-
vania jurisprudence."83 In order to achieve that goal, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania directed litigants to brief and analyze the
following four factors: "1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional
provision; 2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-
law; 3) related case-law from other states; 4) policy considerations,
including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicabil-
ity within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence."" Lastly, the su-
preme court held that "an examination of related federal prece-
dent may be useful as part of the state constitutional analysis, not
as binding authority, but as one form of guidance."
85
This is, in many ways, a remarkable opinion. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court provided clear and concise guidance to those
bringing state constitution claims, spelling out what it wanted and
how it was to be presented. This opinion also provided precedent
for the court to find greater protections of rights and liberties in
the state constitution than those provided in the federal constitu-
tion.
Armed with the precedent of Edmunds, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court turned its attention to Love v. Borough of Strouds-
burg,"" in which it considered an ordinance passed by the Borough
of Stroudsburg that restricted parking in a certain residential
area to only those persons with permits for that residential area. 87
180. Edmunds, 586 A-2d at 894-95.
181. Id. at 895.
182. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
183. Edmunds, 586 A-2d at 895.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 597 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1991).
187. Love, 597 A.2d at 1138.
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Visitors to that area were allowed to park for one hour, but after
that hour passed, such visitors were subject to a fine for illegal
parking.88 On October 4, 1988, appellant received a ticket indicat-
ing he had violated the parking ordinance, thus subjecting him to
a fifteen dollar fine.'89 Appellant filed an action for declaratory
relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County.9 ° The ac-
tion was dismissed by that court, and that dismissal was affirmed
by the Commonwealth Court.'9 '
On appeal, a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
recognized that the equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution was embodied in Article I, Section 1, and Article I,
Section 26.192 The court then held that the state equal protection
provision was to be analyzed under the same standards used by
the United States Supreme Court when analyzing an equal pro-
tection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.'93 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania then reaffirmed the three standards of re-
view-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis.'94
Lastly, the court found that the ordinance impacted neither sus-
pect classes nor fundamental rights, and as such, it would be ana-
lyzed under the rational basis test."' The court found that the
ordinance passed the rational basis test, and thus, was constitu-
tional.'96
About a year later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard the
case of Harristown Development Corp. v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania Department of General Services.'97 This case involved a
statute passed by the General Assembly that provided that a non-
profit corporation which collected over $1,500,000.00 in proceeds
from the rental of property to the Commonwealth would be subject
to the terms of the Sunshine Act and the Right to Know Law.9
The interesting part of this case was the way Justice Flaherty in-
serted Article III, Section 32, into the equal protection discussion.










197. 614 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1992).
198. Harristown Dev. Corp., 614 A.2d at 1129.
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statute violated, inter alia, Article I, Sections 1, 17, and 26, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.'99 The Commonwealth Court initially
seems to have raised Article III, Section 32, but that court held
that the statute was not unconstitutional as a special law rather
than on an equal protection basis.2 0 Only when coming before the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did the appellant raise Article III,
Section 32, in an equal protection context-and even then it ap-
peared to have couched its argument in terms of the prohibition
against special laws provided by that section rather than in terms
211of equal protection per se. It was Justice Flaherty who discussed
Article III, Section 32, in terms of equal protection.0 2
This was the last significant equal protection case implicating
Article III, Section 32. From this case on, Article III, Section 32,
would be distinguished from equal protection analysis and used
pursuant to the "special law" language within the section.
A case illustrating this new analysis of Article III, Section 32, is
Wilkinsburg Police Officers Association v. Commonwealth.2 °3 The
issue in this case involved the Financially Distressed Municipali-
ties Act (commonly known as Act 47) and its implementation in
the municipality of Wilkinsburg." The Wilkinsburg Police Offi-
cers Association ("Association") argued that fiscal recovery plan
adopted by the Borough of Wilkinsburg ("Borough") violated the
Pennsylvania Constitution in that it impinged upon the collective
bargaining agreement between the Association and the Borough
and thus violated or impaired contract rights,2 5 it violated Article
III, Section 31, of the Pennsylvania Constitution 6 and it violated
Article III, Section 32, because section 252 of Act 47 was a special
law regulating labor.20 7  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Association had not pled sufficient facts in order to estab-
lish a violation of Article III, Section 32.20s In its somewhat limited
discussion of this section, the court held that "this constitutional
prohibition [against special laws] requires that any statutory clas-
199. Id.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 1131.
202. Id.
203. 636 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1993).
204. Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass'n, 636 A-2d at 135.
205. Id. at 136.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 137.
208. Id. at 139-40.
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The court was very careful not use any equal protection language.
It also cited Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency,
210
another case where the court, rather than use Article III, Section
32, for equal protection purposes, couched its holdings in terms of
the "special laws" clause in Section 32.21
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the meantime, began to
firm up the notion that the equal protection provision of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution existed in a combination of Article I, Section
1 and Article I, Section 26 in McCusker v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeal Board (Rushton Mining Company).2 2 In McCusker,
the supreme court considered whether or not a section of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which provided that the widow or
widower of a deceased employee would have his or her benefits
terminated if it was ascertained that the living spouse had en-
tered into a meretricious relationship, violated the equal protec-
tion provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 3 The court first
reaffirmed that Article I, Sections 1 and 26, form the equal protec-
tion provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution.214 The court also
reaffirmed the three standards of review-strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny and rational basis-and the threshold question
of whether or not a classification has been created.2 5 The court
concluded by finding that the section in question did not violate
the Pennsylvania Constitution.21
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then took what may be de-
scribed as a brief equal protection frolic. The court looked to Arti-
cle I, Section 17, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and for a brief
period of time, it indicated that this section might also be a source
of equal protection law in this Commonwealth.
In Hoffman v. Township of Whitehall,"7 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court examined the use of veteran's preferences in the
state civil service promotions.2 8 The court held that, under the
1874 Constitution, such promotions were found to be unconstitu-
209. Wilkinsburg Police Officers Ass'n, 636 A.2d at 140.
210. 331 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1975).
211. Tosto, 331 A.2d at 204.
212. 639 A.2d 776 (Pa. 1994).
213. McCusker, 639 A.2d at 777.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 778.
216. Id. at 781.
217. 677 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 1996).
218. Hoffman, 677 A-2d at 1201.
Spring 2004 Equal Protection 487
Duquesne Law Review
tional pursuant to Article III, Section 7.219 The majority in this
opinion found that, under general equal protection principles and
pursuant to Article I, Section 17, the preferences remained uncon-
stitutional.22 °
Although it is a bit of a stretch to find much equal protection
analysis in this decision, it is appropriate to consider it when one
remembers the early cases decided pursuant to Article III, Section
32.221 However, the possibility of equal protection analysis under
Article I, Section 17, was to be short-lived.
First, in a case decided about a year after Hoffman, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article I, Section 17, is
the contracts clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, much like
Article I, Section 10 is the contracts clause of the United States
Constitution.222 Then, about three years after Hoffman, in another
case about veteran's preferences, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the Hoffman court's analysis of Article I, Section
17, was mere dicta, and furthermore, that the dicta misconstrued
Article I, Section 17.23 These two decisions effectively shut-off any
future attempts to use Article I, Section 17, in an equal protection
context.
Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to dis-
tinguish Article III, Section 32, from equal protection analysis. A
clear example of this is Torbik v. Luzerne County.224 In this case,
the appellants were hotel owners who brought a constitutional
challenge against an act of the General Assembly and a Luzerne
County ordinance which allowed Luzerne County to tax hotel
rooms in order to finance a convention center.25 The appellants
brought, inter alia, an equal protection claim. 26 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court addressed the equal protection claim strictly on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds and found no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.27 The court then addressed Article III,
Section 32, and found that the act and ordinance were not special
219. Id. at 1202.
220. Id. at 1202-03.
221. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
222. Bible v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor and Indus., 696 A.2d 1149,
1151 (Pa. 1997).
223. Hous. Auth. of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Serv. Comm'n,
730 A.2d 935, 949 n.20 (Pa. 1999).
224. 696 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 1997).
225. Torbik, 696 A.2d at 1142-43.
226. Id. at 1144.
227. Id. at 1145-46.
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laws in violation of that section of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.228
This case, much like Wilkinsburg Police Officers Association,
distinguished Article III, Section 32, from equal protection analy-
sis and limited its authority to "special laws." It seemed clear
that, from this point forward, equal protection analyses were to be
done pursuant to Article I, Sections 1 and 26.
The next important equal protection case was Small v. Horn.229
In this case, inmates confined in a state prison brought suit after
the Department of Corrections revoked their permission to wear
civilian clothing when housed in the general population. 2" Al-
though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the prisoners were
not entitled to any relief,21 the opinion did define the suspect
classes entitled to strict scrutiny and the sensitive classes entitled
to intermediate scrutiny.32 The court held that "[s]uspect classes
are race and national origin, and, for purposes of state (as opposed
to federal) laws alienage." 3  The court went on to note that
"[q]uasi-suspect classes are gender, and legitimacy. This court has




Again, while this was not necessarily a groundbreaking holding,
it is important considering the confused state of equal protection
analysis in Pennsylvania for the ten years after the Parker White
Metal decision. Furthermore, this restatement of suspect and
sensitive classes places these terms into Pennsylvania jurispru-
dence, and thus, it would allow them to be used in terms of a strict
state constitution equal protection challenge.
The last significant case of the 1990's was Smith v. Coyne.235
The case was a consolidation of a number of landlord-tenant cases
all of which raised the same issue: whether the requirement by a
tenant to post a bond of three months rent or the amount of rent
in arrears, whichever is less, in order to secure supersedeas actu-
ally acted as a barrier to low-income tenants barring them from
having a trial by jury in a landlord-tenant action.236 The Pennsyl-
228. Id. at 1146-47.
229. 722 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1998).
230. Small, 722 A.2d at 666.
231. Id. at 673.
232. Id. at 672.
233. Id. at 672 n. 14 (citations omitted).
234. Id. at 672 n.15 (citations omitted).
235. 722 A.2d 1022 (Pa. 1999).
236. Coyne, 722 A.2d at 1023.
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vania Supreme Court found that while the right to a trial by jury
was a fundamental right worthy of having any legislation imping-
ing upon it subject to strict scrutiny, there was no constitutional
right to housing, and thus, the proper equal protection analysis in
this matter was rational basis 27
The significant portion of this decision was the fact that the
equal protection analysis was done pursuant only to the Four-
teenth Amendment. There was no mention of the equal protection
provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. This was a harbinger
of things to come.
The 1990's began with the promise of Edmunds and ended with
the whimper of Smith v. Coyne. In Love, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that the equal protection provision of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution is embodied in Article I, Sections 1 and 26.
Also, in that same decision the supreme court reaffirmed the three
standards of review used in equal protection analysis. In
McCusker, the concept of the threshold question of whether or not
a classification is created was reaffirmed. There was the brief
equal protection detour into Article I, Section 17. Lastly, the court
explicitly identified suspect classes and sensitive classes in Small
v. Horn. Yet, there was, overall, a retreat from independent equal
protection analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution. This
retreat continued in the new millennium.
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE 2000's-THE CONTINUING
RETREAT FROM INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION
The turn of the millennium has, so far, done little to further
equal protection analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In
fact, unlike the 1970's and 1980's, where there was a growth and
an independence in equal protection analysis under the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, the 1990's seemed to represent a stagnation
and the 2000's, so far, seem to represent an actual decline.
The first important case of the new millennium, however,
showed signs of growth in state constitutional jurisprudence. In
that case, Harrisburg School District v. Hickok,238 the issue of
whether an act of the General Assembly which provided that
school districts that performed poorly be identified and assisted by
237. Id. at 1025-26.
238. 761 A.2d 1132, (Pa. 2000).
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the Department of Education was constitutional "insofar as it sin-
gle[d] out schools in Harrisburg for special treatment" was pre-
sented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.3 9 The court held that
the act violated Article III, Section 32, in that it was special legis-
lation designed to single out the school districts in Harrisburg and
the classification was not based on real distinctions.24 °
The most important part of this decision, however, was located
in a footnote. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court revived the rea-
sonable relationship standard pursuant to analysis under Article
III, Section 32.24' This was important because the reasonable rela-
tionship test was more demanding than the rational basis test.
22
Furthermore, while Article III, Section 32, may no longer be useful
in terms of equal protection analysis, utilizing a test unique to
that section helps to give it a vitality that had been lost.
Meanwhile, equal protection analysis once again grew murky.
In Commonwealth v. Means,43 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the equal protection provision of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution was only in Article I, Section .2" This was contrary to a
number of previous holdings in which the equal protection provi-
sion was found to be embodied in Article I, Sections 1 and 26,
combined.
The next blow to independent equal protection analysis under
the Pennsylvania Constitution was Erfer v. Commonwealth.43
Although this case does relocate the state equal protection provi-
sion in Article I, Sections 1 and 26, '46 the court held that when a
claim "is predicated on the equal protection guarantee contained
in [Article 1, Sections] 1 and 26, this court has previously deter-
mined that this right is coterminous with its federal counter-
part. 247 The Erfer court claimed as authority Love v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, but that does not appear to be correct. In Love, the
supreme court held "[t]he equal protection provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution are analyzed by this Court under the same
standards used by the United States Supreme Court when review-
239. Harrisburg School Dist., 761 A.2d at 1134.
240. Id. at 1136.
241. Id. at 1136 n.2.
242. STONE, supra note 39, at 570.
243. 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001).
244. Means, 773 A.2d at 147.
245. 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002).
246. Erfer, 794 A.2d at 328.
247. Id. at 332.
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ing equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."2 4
The word "coterminous," on the other hand, means, "([o]f ideas or
events) coextensive in time and meaning. ,249 Love stands for the
idea that the same standards are used in both federal and state
equal protection analysis, but that does not mean that the two
provisions are the same. Erfer, on the other hand, does seem to
stand for the proposition that the state and the federal equal pro-
tection provisions are the same. The difference is of great signifi-
cance. Under Love, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was free to
find that a certain right was fundamental or important or that a
certain classification was suspect or sensitive and provide greater
protection than the United States Supreme Court while still stay-
ing within the framework of the three standards of review. Erfer
provided no such leeway because the two provisions were the
same, and thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could not find
that the Pennsylvania Constitution provided greater equal protec-
tion than the federal constitution.
The general decline of independent equal protection analysis
under the Pennsylvania Constitution was well illustrated by a
case decided on November 20, 2002. That case, Commonwealth v.
Harris,25 was another case where a man convicted of a capital
crime brought an equal protection challenge to his conviction
based upon the prosecution's allegedly unconstitutional use of
peremptory challenges.251 The significance of this case was the
fact that the state constitution equal protection provision was not
even cited and the majority of the case law cited was federal case
law.
25 2
While it is possible that the appellant did not raise state consti-
tutional grounds, it seems unlikely considering the dissent of
Chief Justice Nix in Hardcastle, where he opined that peremptory
challenges are per se unconstitutional under Article I, Section
26.53 Furthermore, the fact that the dissent in Harris did not
mention state equal protection grounds,254 even in passing, also
showed the extent of the decline of independent state constitution
equal protection analysis in Pennsylvania.
248. Love, 597 A.2d at 1139.
249. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 351 (7th ed. 1999).
250. 817 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 2002).
251. Harris, 817 A.2d at 1042.
252. Id. at 1042-46.
253. Hardcastle, 546 A.2d at 1114 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).




The decline in independent equal protection analysis under the
Pennsylvania Constitution does not have to continue. First, none
of the cases discussed here have been explicitly overturned. While
Kroger and its progeny under Article III, Section 32 may be, for all
intents and purposes, overturned, the basic idea that equal protec-
tion under the Pennsylvania Constitution is important per se can
be revitalized. Even after Parker White Metal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court continued to do equal protection analysis under
the Pennsylvania Constitution. Second, the court has recently
held that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protec-
tion of freedom of expression than does the federal constitution.
25
If the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection in
the area of freedom of expression, it may also provide greater pro-
tection than the federal constitution in other areas as well-such
as equal protection. Finally, as a matter of public policy, the Su-
preme Court needs to do independent equal protection analysis
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Lively debate about equal
protection under the Pennsylvania Constitution can only
strengthen general legal scholarship and the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution itself.
255. Paps A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002).
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